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Abstract
The problem of finding the k most critical nodes, referred to as the top-k prob-
lem, is a very important one in several contexts such as information diffusion and
preference aggregation in social networks, clustering of data points, etc. It has been
observed in the literature that the value allotted to a node by most of the popular
cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, acts as a good measure of appropri-
ateness of that node (or a data point) to be included in the top-k set, by itself.
However, in general, nodes having the highest k values are not the desirable top-k
nodes, because the appropriateness of a node to be a part of the top-k set depends
on other nodes in the set. As this is not explicitly captured by cooperative game
theoretic solution concepts, it is necessary to post-process the obtained values in
order to output the suitable top-k nodes. In this paper, we propose several such
post-processing methods and give reasoning behind each of them, and also propose
a standalone algorithm that combines cooperative game theoretic solution concepts
with the popular greedy hill-climbing algorithm.
Keywords: cooperative game theory, social networks, information diffusion, influence
maximization, preference aggregation, clustering, greedy hill-climbing.
1 Introduction
The combinatorial problem of determining top k nodes is encountered in a number of
contexts, some of which are as follows:
• Influence maximization: determining k seed nodes to trigger a campaign so as to
maximize its spread in a social network [7]
• Influence limitation: determining k nodes to trigger a counter-campaign so as to
limit the spread of some misinformation in a social network [2]
1This is a work in progress. If you have any comments, suggestions, or doubts, please send an email
to swapnil.dhamal@gmailcom
2The first and second authors have contributed equally.
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• Virus inoculation: determining k nodes to vaccinate so as to restrict the spread of
some epidemic in a social network [1]
• Preference aggregation: determining k representatives so that their aggregated pref-
erences is close to the aggregate preference of a social network [5]
• K-means clustering: determining k cluster centers for initiating the K-means clus-
tering algorithm so as to partition a dataset into k clusters in an effective way [6]
(for consistency, we refer to the points in the dataset as nodes only)
In all of these problems, the input is either a network, or that can be converted to
a network. For the problems of influence maximization, influence limitation, and virus
inoculation, the input is a weighted and directed social network, where the weight βxy
(different from βyx) corresponds to a measure of influence of node x on node y. The
input to the preference aggregation problem is a weighted but undirected social network,
where the weight βxy (or equivalently βyx) corresponds to a measure of similarity between
preferences of nodes x and y. The input to the clustering problem is a dataset of points,
which can be converted to a weighted undirected complete network, where the weight βxy
(or equivalently βyx) corresponds to a measure of similarity between data points x and y.
1.1 Background and Literature
Most of the practical top-k problems are computationally hard to solve, even under very
simplified models. Certain properties of the underlying objective functions, such as mono-
tonicity and submodularity, have been exploited to develop constant-factor approximation
algorithms, for example, greedy hill-climbing for the influence maximization problem un-
der simplified models of information diffusion [7]. However, these properties are lost once
the models become more realistic. So there is a need of developing algorithms that are
agnostic in practice to the properties of the underlying objective function.
There exist methods for combinatorial optimization, like cross-entropy [3], which work
well in practice. However, in recent times, cooperative game theoretic solution concepts
have been used effectively in the literature for detecting top k critical nodes. A cooperative
game is represented by (N, ν), where N is the set of nodes and ν : 2N → R is the valuation
function. A solution concept is an allocation (φ1, . . . , φn), where n = |N | and φx is the
value allotted to node x. There exist several solution concepts in the literature, some
of the popular ones being Shapley value, Nucleolus, Banzhaf index, Gately point, etc.,
each possessing an individual list of certain desirable properties. It can be seen that if
the valuation function of the game is defined as the objective function itself, the value
allotted to a node by most of the popular solution concepts acts as a good measure of
appropriateness of that node to be included in the top-k set. This has led to application
of cooperative game theory for several problems of practical interest.
Narayanam and Narahari [8] propose a heuristic based on Shapley value for influence
maximization in social networks, whereas Premm Raj and Narahari [9] use Shapley value
for the problem of influence limitation in social networks. Garg, Narahari, and Murty [6]
formulate the clustering problem as a cooperative game and also show that Shapley value
for the game can be exactly computed in polynomial time, while Dhamal et al. [4] prove
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the equivalence of several solution concepts, namely, Shapley value, Nucleolus, Gately
point, and τ -value for the formulated game.
1.2 Motivation
As mentioned earlier, it has been observed in the literature that the value allotted to a
node by most of the well-known cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, acts as a
good measure of appropriateness of that node to be included in the top-k set. However, it
can be easily seen using experiments that the value allotted to a node is as a good measure,
when the node has to chosen all by itself. As the appropriateness of a node to be a part
of the top-k set depends on other nodes in the set, nodes having the highest k values are
generally not the desirable top-k nodes. This fact is not explicitly captured by cooperative
game theoretic solution concepts, and so in order to output the suitable top-k nodes, it is
necessary to post-process the obtained values. Hence the motivation behind this paper is
to propose several such post-processing methods. We also propose a standalone algorithm
that combines cooperative game theoretic solution concepts with the popular greedy hill-
climbing algorithm, taking into account the fact that the appropriateness of a node to be
chosen in the top-k set depends on other nodes in the set.
We now present a number of post-processing methods, primarily in the context of
information diffusion; they can be extended to other contexts. However, some methods
would be more suitable for a given application than others. One can derive variants of
the proposed methods or use multiple methods in conjunction.
2 Post-processing Methods
Given an input that is a graph (or that can be converted to a graph), let βxy denote the
weight of edge xy, based on the context as described before. Starting from the null set,
the top-k set builds up as nodes get added to it, until it reaches cardinality k. The most
direct and na¨ıve method of obtaining the top-k set is to sort nodes in descending order
of their values, say ordered list, and then choose the first k nodes from the list. However,
as explained earlier, nodes having the highest k values are generally not the desirable
top-k nodes, and so there is a need to post-process the obtained values in order to build
an effective top-k set. We propose several post-processing methods that can be broadly
classified into two types, namely,
• Eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes
• Discounting values of neighbors of chosen nodes
In the following methods, neighbors of a node account for both its in-neighbors and out-
neighbors; however, the accounting of neighbors can be altered based on the application.
In the methods that follow, in order to obtain an ordering over multiple nodes that are
allotted equal values, the ties are broken randomly.
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2.1 Eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes
As choosing nodes na¨ıvely may result in the top-k nodes to be clustered in one part of the
network, these methods try to choose the nodes such that they are appropriately spread
in the network, so that they influence or represent as many distinct nodes as possible.
In all the methods of this type, if it is not possible to choose any more nodes using
the elimination approach, the methods reiterate over ordered list and na¨ıvely choose the
unchosen nodes in order. It is to be noted that in the methods of this type, in the context
of information diffusion where the network is directed, the term neighbors refers to both
in-neighbors and out-neighbors. Also, if a node x is both in-neighbor and out-neighbor of
a node y, we consider the mutual edge weight to be max{βxy, βyx} whenever applicable.
2.1.1 Eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes always
This method is the one used in [8] for influence maximization in a social network. It
keeps on choosing the nodes in order from ordered list and skips a node if any of its
neighbors is already chosen in the top-k set. This method is observed to perform well in
the context of information diffusion since once a node is chosen, it would more or less
influence its out-neighbors either directly or indirectly (in multiple hops through other
nodes); furthermore, if a node is chosen before its in-neighbors because of its high value,
it is likely that its in-neighbors would have a high value only because they influence the
former (a more influential node); so the method eliminates both in-neighbors and out-
neighbors. Similarly, for the preference aggregation problem, once a node is chosen, it
would more or less represent its neighbors well. Note that this method is unsuitable for
the clustering problem as the converted input is a complete network.
2.1.2 Eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes based on a threshold
This method is similar to the one used in [6] in the context of clustering. The method that
eliminates neighbors of chosen nodes always, suffers from the fact that multiple nodes that
are highly influential (more or less independent of each other) may be connected with low
edge weights; in such cases, it is undesirable to eliminate the neighbors of such influential
nodes. So instead of eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes always, this method keeps
on choosing the nodes in order from ordered list and skips a node if any of its neighbors
which is already chosen in the top-k set, is such that the corresponding edge weight
exceeds a certain threshold. This method would work well in all the contexts, provided
the threshold is chosen appropriately. One can come up with several variants of this
method; for instance, the threshold could be a fixed one for the entire network or dataset
[6], or it could be a function of the value of the chosen node itself [4].
2.1.3 Eliminating neighbors of chosen nodes based on their local networks
This method determines whether a node should be selected based on its local neighbor-
hood. It keeps on choosing the nodes in order from ordered list and skips a node x if
there exists its neighbor y which is already chosen in the top-k set such that, when all the
neighbors of y are ordered in decreasing order of their edge weights with y, then x lies
in the first half. Note that this fraction half is just a natural first guess; as it acts like a
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threshold, it can also be a fixed one for the entire network or it can be a function of the
value of the chosen node. Intuitively, this method does not eliminate a node when it is a
good candidate in the local neighborhood of the already chosen nodes, that is, it is less
likely to be influenced by or to influence (or is less similar to) the nodes in the top-k set.
2.2 Discounting values of neighbors of chosen nodes
The elimination methods are strict owing to their 0/1 nature of eliminating a node.
Moreover, it is highly likely that it would not be possible to choose any more nodes using
these methods beyond a certain k, resulting in a na¨ıve selection of the unchosen nodes.
One way to overcome these problems is to discount the values of the neighbors of the
chosen nodes based on certain criteria instead of eliminating them.
These methods run in k steps where the value of each node gets updated in each step
t. Let top-k(t) be the top-k set in step t, and let φ
(t)
x be the value of node x in step t. The
initializing top-k set can be given by top-k(0) = {}, and the initializing value of a node
φ
(0)
x = φx is the original value allotted to it. In the methods of this category, we do not
update the values of the nodes which are already chosen in the top-k set, that is,
φ(t)z = φ
(t−1)
z ∀z ∈ top-k
(t−1) (1)
It is important that the values of the chosen nodes do not change after they get added
to the top-k set, since the discounting of the values of unselected nodes critically depends
on these values. In order to explain the methods of this category, let y be the node chosen
in step t, that is, top-k(t) \ top-k(t−1) = {y}. Also let Nw be the set of neighbors of a node
w.
2.2.1 Discounting values of neighbors of chosen nodes - I
φ(t)x = (1− βyx)φ
(t−1)
x ∀x ∈ Ny \ top-k
(t−1) (2)
or φ(t)x =

 ∏
w∈Nx∩top-k(t)
(1− βwx)

 φ(0)x (3)
This discounting is natural in the independent cascade model of information diffusion
where βyx corresponds to the parameter pyx (in independent cascade model, when node y
first becomes active at time τ , it is given a single chance to activate each of its currently
inactive neighbor x at time τ + 1 and it succeeds with probability pyx). Since node x
would get activated because of node y with probability pyx, the value of node x should be
discounted by the factor of pyx whenever any of its neighbor y gets chosen in the top-k set.
Equivalently, since node x would not get directly activated by any of its neighbors that
are chosen in the top-k set, with probability
∏
w∈Nx∩top-k(t)
(1−pwx), the value of node x is
updated using this factor. Note that we ignore the possibility that the influence of node
y can reach node x in multiple hops.
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2.2.2 Discounting values of neighbors of chosen nodes - II
φ(t)x = φ
(t−1)
x − βyx φ
(0)
x ∀x ∈ Ny \ top-k
(t−1) (4)
or φ(t)x =

1−
∑
w∈Nx∩top-k(t)
βwx

φ(0)x (5)
This discounting is natural in the linear threshold model of information diffusion where
βyx corresponds to the parameter byx (in linear threshold model, byx is the influence weight
of node y on node x such that the sum of the influence weights from all of its incoming
neighbors is at most 1; node x gets activated if the sum of the influence weights from its
active incoming neighbors exceeds a certain threshold θx that is drawn from a uniform
distribution between [0, 1]). Analogous to the argument in the previous method, since
node x would not get directly activated by any of its neighbors that are chosen in the
top-k set, with probability 1 −
∑
w∈Nx∩top-k(t)
bwx, the value of node x is updated using
this factor. Note that in this method also, we ignore the possibility that the influence of
node y can reach node x in multiple hops.
2.2.3 Discounting values of neighbors of chosen nodes - III
φ(t)x = φ
(t−1)
x − βxy φ
(t−1)
y ∀x ∈ Ny \ top-k
(t−1) (6)
or φ(t)x = φ
(0)
x −
∑
w∈Nx∩top-k(t)
(
βxw φ
(t−1)
w
)
(7)
This discounting is natural in both independent cascade and linear threshold models of
information diffusion (note the swapping of x and y with respect to the previous methods).
In the independent cascade model, as node x influences node y directly with probability
pxy, it gets a fractional share of the value of node y (since x would be influencing other
nodes indirectly, through y). Now given that node y is chosen in the top-k set, the share
of y’s value should be removed from the value of x. This method uses a simplified expres-
sion for this share, namely, pxy φ
(t−1)
y . Similar argument leads this share to be bxy φ
(t−1)
y
in the linear threshold model. Note that we may be possibly removing more share than
required since there may exist multiple neighbors of x, that are already chosen in the top-k
set, with shares of similar nature (for example, they may be likely to influence almost the
same set of nodes). Owing to this, it is possible for the value of a node to become negative.
Furthermore, depending on the application, one may also update the values of the
nodes using a suitable convex combination of the aforementioned discounting methods.
3 Combining with greedy hill-climbing algorithm
The greedy hill-climbing algorithm is one of the most basic methods used for combinatorial
optimization. Starting with the null set, the greedy hill-climbing algorithm selects k nodes
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one at a time, each time choosing a node that provides the largest marginal increase in
the value of the objective function.
The following method directly utilizes the fact that the appropriateness of a node to
be chosen in the top-k set depends on other nodes which are already chosen in the set.
It is to be noted that this method is a standalone algorithm and not a post-processing
method.
This method runs in k steps where in step t, we define a new cooperative game
(N \ top-k(t−1), ω(t)) where the valuation function ω(t) : 2N\top-k
(t−1)
→ R is given by
ω(t)(S) = ν(top-k(t−1) ∪ S)− ν(top-k(t−1)) (8)
Now form top-k(t) = top-k(t−1) ∪ y, where y is a node with the maximum allocation value
in the game (N \ top-k(t−1), ω(t)).
3.1 Combining Shapley value with greedy hill-climbing
The Shapley value of a node can be computed as the average marginal contribution of
the node in all possible permutations over the set of nodes. Though computing exact
Shapley value allocation for a general game is hard, it can be approximately computed
by considering only a subset of the set of all permutations.
We present a simple algorithm for using Shapley value with greedy hill-climbing for
top-k problems. The first node to be chosen in the top-k set (say y1) can be obtained as
the node with the highest Shapley value, where the Shapley value allocation is computed
by considering only a subset of the set of all permutations. The second node to be chosen
in the top-k set (say y2) can be obtained as the node with the highest Shapley value
among the set of nodes excluding y1, where the Shapley value allocation is now computed
by considering only a subset of the set of all permutations in which y1 is positioned in the
first place. In general, the κth node to be chosen in the top-k set (say yκ) can be obtained
as the node with the highest Shapley value among the set of nodes excluding y1, . . . , yκ−1,
where the Shapley value allocation is computed by considering only a subset of the set of
all permutations in which y1, . . . , yκ−1 are positioned in the first κ− 1 places.
Note, however, that the running time of the combined algorithm would be approxi-
mately k times the running time of computing the approximate Shapley value allocation.
Some of the possible ways of reducing the running time would be to:
(a) reduce the number of permutations for the computation of approximate Shapley
value allocation, since we are only interested in obtaining the node with the highest
or near-highest value, and not in the actual allocation itself,
(b) reduce the number of permutations for later steps, that is, consider more permuta-
tions for obtaining y1 than that for obtaining y2, and so on, owing to the inherent
fact that obtaining an effective y1 is more critical than obtaining an effective y2,
(c) use the combined algorithm only for choosing the first few k˜ critical nodes and then
use some post-processing or discounting approach for choosing the remaining k − k˜
nodes,
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(d) store the marginal contributions of nodes in permutations which are likely to reoc-
cur, for instance, permutations in which nodes with highest weighted degrees are
positioned in the first few places.
4 Discussion
We proposed several methods of post-processing the values obtained using any given
solution concept from cooperative game theory. The proposed methods are quite generic
in nature, but it is possible that some methods better suit a given context than others. One
can derive variants of the proposed methods or use multiple methods in conjunction. We
also proposed a standalone algorithm that combines cooperative game theoretic solution
concepts with the greedy hill-climbing algorithm, by considering that the appropriateness
of a node to be chosen in the top-k set depends on other nodes in the set.
We compared the proposed methods on small datasets for the purpose of our observa-
tions, the results of which are not presented here. The results of extensive experimentation
on large datasets will be directly added in the subsequent versions of the paper.
For any practical problem, the natural valuation function would lead to intractable
computation for most solution concepts. Though approximate algorithms exist for several
solution concepts, an alternative would to formulate a valuation function that closely
resembles the problem and at the same time, facilitates efficient computation of solution
concepts.
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